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Abstract 
This study uses a sample of 119 commercial banks in Asia (specifically China, Philippine, Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia and Thailand) to test the impact of board governance on the bank performance. The 
result reported based on OLS and within estimators. In addition, two step system estimator is employed 
in this study to solve endogeneity problem in corporate governance literature. The finding reported that 
bank with large board and more independent directors sit on board it help the bank to achieve higher 
performance. The result shows that bank can achieve better performance with younger directors. While 
CEO duality and female directors are insignificant to influence the bank performance. The result also 
reported that the higher loan losses provision leads to bank performance decline. This study employ 
various governance characteristics towards performance among banking sector in selected Asian 
countries. The result of this study highlight the effectiveness of the board as a functioning device in 
monitoring and advising manager. 
Keywords: Board Size, Board Independence, Board Average Age, CEO Duality, Female Director 
JEL classification: G21, G32 
Introduction 
Bank plays a crucial economic function as an intermediary to channel funds from savers and depositors to 
help economic growth. In banking sector, the effectiveness of corporate governance is critically needed to 
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maintain higher level of public trust and confidence in banking system. Ineffective corporate governance can 
lead to banks facing problem that can affect their performance and economy as a whole. Corporate 
governance has also caught the attention of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 
furthering its understanding and improving corporate governance in the banking sector. This is essential to 
continue safeguard depositors’ funds, to assurance soundness of financial system and for a better bank 
performance. One of the key elements of corporate governance highlighted by the Committee is efficient 
monitoring the actions of the directors, managers and supervisors of banks from both Basel Committee 
member or non-member countries even though each has unique legal and regulatory systems (Basel 
Committee, 2006). The ineffectiveness of corporate governance continues to surface around the world with 
numerous corporate scandals. Thus, many believe the existing corporate governance devices still unable to 
control the behavior of managers and board of directors. However, numerous studies about corporate 
governance mainly focus on non-financial companies (e.g., Bauer, Eicholtz, & Kok, 2010; Mahmood & 
Zaheer, 2011; Azeez, 2015; Buallay, Hamdan, & Zureigat, 2017; Laoworapong, Supattarakul, & Swierczek, 
2018), only few papers emphases on banks (e.g., De Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Saeed, Murtaza, & Sohail, 
2013; Belhaj & Mateus, 2016; Fidanoski, Mateska, & Simeonovski, 2017). The complexity of organizational 
structure makes corporate governance in banks is special compare to non-financial companies (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003). Due to this complexity, it increases the asymmetry information and diminishes 
stakeholders’ power to monitor bank managers’ decision (Andres & Vallelado, 2008). Good corporate 
governance systems in bank can be seen if bank has highly performance (Tandelilin, Kaaro, Mahadwartha 
& Suprivatna, 2007). The regulators are also anxious on how corporate governance could hamper the bank 
performance since it could affect the health of economy (Adams & Mehra, 2003). Therefore, this study intends 
to evaluate the effectiveness of corporate governance on bank performance.  
Board of directors is the internal governance mechanism that the bank could use to monitor and control the 
agency problem. Moreover, the appointed members elected by the shareholders has the ultimate 
responsibility as a decision making body including for formulating business strategy, making bank loan and 
imposing governance structure and risk management (Sumner & Webb, 2005). With the knowledge about 
the complexity of banking business, regulatory, and external environment, they can efficiently monitor and 
advise managers on decision making. Hence, this study mainly focuses on the role of board governance on 
the bank performance. We expect if board effectively functioning as a monitoring and advisory device to 
manager, banks are better governed and the performance will increase.  
Literature reviews 
The percentage of independent directors on the board of directors positively affects performance, measured 
by Tobin’s Q and, alternatively, by ROA among 159 listed banks in nine countries (Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US) (García-Meca, García-Sánchez, & 
Martínez-Ferrero, 2015). When, independent directors have a better monitoring role, bringing their 
connection and expertise (Al-Najjar, 2014), the costs of monitoring managers are low (Pathan & Skully, 2010) 
and bank can have better achievement. However, Chou and Buchdadi (2017) reports that the independent 
board has a positive impact on net interest margin among the big scale bank. In small scale bank the 
independent board of directors has the positive impact on the market value, but they would have lack of 
information that could obstruct the accounting based profit of the bank. In addition, Handriani and Robiyanto 
(2019) examine the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of 293 firms listed 
in the Indonesian Stock Exchange and make public that the independent board has significant positive effect 
on firm performance. The coefficient of independent board of director has a positive and significant impact 
on ROE and EPS (Rahman and Islam, 2019). 
On the contrary, Pathan and Faff (2013) reveal that banks in which boards have more independent directors 
will perform worse. The impact is prevalent particularly for banks with low market power, exposed to external 
takeovers and/or of smaller size. Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2014) find that a more independent board 
is associated with increases in the likelihood of receiving Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds. This 
suggests that board independence may not necessarily be beneficial for banks because independent 
directors may not have sufficient expertise to monitor complex banking firms and oversee the actions of the 
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Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (Adams, 2012). Further, board independence is found to be a significant 
negative predictor of firm performance among firms in MENA region (Mertzanis, Basuony, and Mohamed, 
2019). 
H1: There is positive relationship between board independence and bank performance. 
Based on large US BHCs, Adams and Mehran (2012) support that there is positive relationship between 
bank board size and performance. Similarly, De Andres and Vallelado (2008) show that there is a positive 
but inverted U-shaped relation between bank and board size. Even through large board would create more 
value, but non-monotonic relationship exists. When the number of directors reaches 19, bank performance 
starts to decline due to problems of coordination, control, and decision making. This is consistent with the 
finding of García-Meca et al. (2015) and Aebi, Sabato, & Schmid (2012) where board size is positively 
associated with bank performance. Company with larger board size implies more resources in terms of 
providing counsel (Dallas, 2001), advising on companies’ strategies (Pearce & Zahra, 1991), and more 
problem solving capabilities (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). Corporate governance practices proved to have 
impact on the performance of bank. The performance of banking companies in Bangladesh is positively 
influence by its board size (Rahman & Islam, 2019). This finding is consistent with that of Mertzanis, Basuony, 
and Mohamed (2019) who also documents a significant positive relationship between board size and firm 
performance in MENA region.  
This contradicts from earlier finding of Jensen (1993) where large board size would make less monitoring 
due to free rider problems and time consuming in process of decision making. Staikouras, Staikouras, & 
Agoraki (2007), Wang, Lu, & Lin (2012) (2012) and Pathan and Faff (2013) also observe a significant negative 
relationship between board size and bank performance. Bhattarai (2017) discover that board size has 
negative effect on financial performance of commercial banks in Nepal. The result also supported by study 
done by Lamichhane (2018) among Nepalese firms (seven commercial banks, seven development banks, 
five finance company, one trading company, two manufacturing, two hydropower, two hotels and four 
insurance companies) depict that board size is negatively related with ROA. This is according 
to organizational theory where boards with large number of members take comparatively longer time take to 
decisions (Steiner, 2007). 
H2: There is positive relationship between board size and bank performance. 
The stock market returns are positively and significantly related to age (Nguyen, Hagendorff, & Eshraghi, 
2015). Younger appointees have more incentive to raise their job security by engaging in risky and value-
destroying activities. Therefore, market investors react less favorably to the appointment of a young 
appointee because they predict that this appointment will impose additional agency costs to the bank. 
Moreover, age diversity may improve the experiences, resources knowledge, networks of the board which in 
turn improves bank profitability (Ararat, Aksu, & Tansel, 2010; Kim & Lim, 2010; Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, & 
Hanuman, 2012). In addition, diversified representation of different generations in boards enhances the 
flexibility of the decision-making by balancing risks and ultimately leads to better firm performance (Ararat et 
al., 2010). By contrast, Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, and Xu (2011) find that average director age exhibits a 
concave relationship with financial performance. Variety of directors’ views with respect to risk, prudence and 
wealth might harm bank performance (Talavera, Yin, & Zhang, 2017) since the old and the young director 
have conflicts in decision-making (Ali, Ng, & Kulik, 2014). 
H3: There is positive relationship between board average age and bank performance. 
For board diversity, female on board has a positive significant on ROA and ROE (Mertzanis, Basuony, and 
Mohamed, 2019). García-Meca et al., (2015) results suggest that the presence of women on bank’s board 
improves governance and bank profitable. This finding also suggests that women directors are not substitutes 
for traditional corporate directors with identical abilities but rather that qualified women directors have unique 
characteristics that create additional value in banks. Moreover, females bring forward new opinions and 
perspectives that would not be demonstrated if the board were to be homogeneous, and this may improve 
financial performance (De Cabo, Gimeno, & Nieto, 2012). Pathan and Faff (2013) study large US bank 
holding companies over the period 1997–2011 and find that gender diversity improves bank performance. 
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However, this positive effect declines after financial crisis periods respectively. Due to difference in culture, 
economic background and bank’s size, Tu, Loi, & Yen (2015) find that    percentage of women on boards of 
directors has a neutral effect on firm’s performance in Malaysia. However, according to Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) and Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011) gender diversity will only improve performance in weak corporate 
governance settings because firms will benefit from women directors that can provide additional monitoring 
on their boards of directors.  
H4: There is positive relationship between board gender and bank performance. 
Rahman and Islam (2019) disclose there is a positive relationship of a CEO status on the profitability (ROA) 
of publicly traded banks in Bangladesh. However, CEO status has a negative impact on ROE. In line with 
their finding, Mertzanis, Basuony, and Mohamed (2019) state that CEO duality is a significant predictor for 
ROA and Tobin’s Q as measures of performance. While the role of leadership factor in firm performance is 
controversial, it seems that in the MENA region countries separating the role of the CEO and the chairman 
exerts a positive role on performance of firms. On the other hand, the ROE model of CEO duality does not 
document a significant effect.  
When independent directors account for a small proportion of a board's membership, CEO duality has 
negative and significant impacts on operating performance (Duru, Iyengar, & Zampelli, 2016). However, as 
the proportion of independent directors rises, these negative impacts are mitigated to an extent that they 
eventually disappear and turn positive as the proportion of independent director increases further. Grove et 
al., (2011) show that CEO duality is negatively associated with financial performance (measured by ROA 
and excess stock returns) in the pre-crisis period but not in the crisis period. Over-powerful CEO would lead 
banks into risky strategies and in turn bank poorly performance. As a result, several major banks separated 
the role. In addition, Pathan (2009) shows that CEO power (CEO’s ability to control board decision, including 
CEO duality) negatively affects bank risk-taking because bank managers including CEOs may prefer lower 
risk due to their non-diversifiable wealth, including human capital invested in their banks, and comparatively 
fixed compensation (e.g., salary). Also, Wang et al., (2012) report a negative impact on BHCs performance 
from CEO duality.  
H5: There is negative relationship between CEO duality and bank performance. 
Chimkono, Muturi, and Njeru (2016) reveal that non-performing loan ratio (NPLs) has a significant effect on 
the performance of commercial banks sector. NPLs had a negative influence on bank performance (Mausya, 
2009; Qin & Pastory, 2012; Li & Zou, 2014; Lata, 2014; Roy, 2015). High percentages NPLs are often 
associated with performance problems of banks and financial crises in both developing and developed 
countries (Khemraj & Pasha, 2009). Evidence from Asia indicates that there was more than threefold 
increase in the volume of NPLs in Indonesian banks in the period leading up to the financial crisis. Besides, 
over 60 banks collapsed during the crisis due to their NPLs represented about 75% percent of its total loan 
portfolios (Cortavarria, Dziobek, Kanaya, & Song, 2000). Loan loss provision is negative and significant 
influence on bank profitability (Miller & Noulas, 1997; Vong, 2005; Ramlall, 2009; Sufian & Habibullah, 2009). 
It reveals that the major portion of banks operations are involves in borrowing and advancing activities due 
to banks face threats of high credit risk and they create a loan loss provisions to lessen the risk. This risk 
adverse policy of banks leads towards decrease in profitability. It could be due to firstly according to 
accounting principles the loan loss provisions are created from earnings of banks on annual basis. Secondly 
banks tends to be more profitable when they are able to undertake more lending activities if a higher level of 
provision is maintained then bank’s ability to give loan will decrease and thus depresses banks’ return on 
asset significantly (Vong & Chan, 2009). A well-managed bank is perceived to be of lower loan loss provision 
and such an advantage will be translated into higher profitability (Mustafa, Ansari, & Younis, 2012). 
Albertazzi & Gambacorta (2009) use five performance indicators (net interest income, non-interest 
income, operating cost, provisions, profit before tax, and ROE) to investigate the influence of stock 
market volatility on bank performance for main industrialized countries during the period 1981-2003. 
They report that net interest income, non-interest income, provision and ROE are positively related to 
stock market volatility, while the stock market volatility is negatively related to profit before tax. Further, 
no relationship between stock market volatility and provisions is reported. Due to the fluctuation of the 
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stock market volatility, consumers are more likely to deposit their money into banks than investing in 
the stock market which makes banks have better performance (Albertazzi & Gambacorta, 2010). Tan 
and Floros (2012) find that the more volatile the stock market, the better performance the Chinese banks 
have. A high market capitalization ratio means economic expansion, while the easy access for firms to 
finance through stock markets reduces bank's business opportunities which results in a deterioration 
of performance (Liu & Wilson, 2009). 
Data and Empirical Method  
This study examines the impact of board governance in banking sector over the period of 2011 to 2015. The 
initial sample of this study is 148 commercial bank in Asia (namely China, Philippine, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia and Thailand). After excluding incomplete data during the period of the study, the final sample 
consists of 119 commercial bank (595 observations). Two alternative proxies of bank performance are 
employed to investigate the relationship between board governance and bank performance namely return 
on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). As for board governance five variables are used (1) board size, 
(2) Board independent, (3) Board average age, (4) Female director on board and (5) CEO duality. While non-
performing loan, loan loss provision and share price volatility representing as control variables for bank. The 
detail measure for each of variable is shown in Table 1.  
Table 1: Variable and measurement 
  
Notation Variable Name Description 
Dependent Variable 
ROA Return on Assets Net Income to Average total assets 
ROE Return on Equity 
Net income available for common shareholder to Average total 
common equity. 
Independent Variable 
B_Ind Board Independent Independent directors to total number of directors 
B_Size Board Size Log (total number of directors on the board) 
BA_Age Board Average Age Log (Average Age of the member of the board) 
B_Female Female Directors Percentage of women on the board of directors 
C_Duality CEO Duality Dummy 1 if CEO is also Chairman, otherwise 0 
Control Variable 
NPL Non-Performing Loan Non-Performing loan to Total loan 
L_loss Loan Loss Provision Provision for loan losses to Total assets 
Vol. Volatility 
Standard deviation of day to day logarithmic historical price 
changes. 
   
The sample size for each country is select based on their number of bank listed in the exchange market and 
the availability of the data provided from Bloomberg database. The descriptive data for each country shown 
in Table 2. This study based on panel data analysis to examine the effect board governance on bank 
performance. Panel data analysis is based on the combination of two dimensions of data, which is cross-
sections (indicated by subscript i) such as individual, companies, countries and time-series data (indicated 
by subscript t) collected information on a single unit over the duration of study. 
Model 1 
 
itεVol*7βL_loss*6βNPL*5βC_Duality*5β                         
B_Female*4βBA_Age*3βB_Indepen*2β)Log(B_Size*1βα
++++
+++++=ePerformanc
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Model  2 
 
Where; α = constant term; log (B_Size) = logarithm board size; B_Indepen = Board Independence and 
BA_Age = Board average age; B_Female = Board Female director; C_Duality = CEO duality; NPL = Non-
performing loan; L_loss = Loss loan provision; Vol = share price volatility.   
Panel data allow control for individual heterogeneity compared with cross sectional and time series data 
(Baltagi, 2005). Analysis of data without considering the heterogeneity could lead to bias results. According 
to Andres and Vallelado (2008) problem of simultaneity may exist because some of independent variables 
like board size and board independence might be determined simultaneously with dependent variables. To 
control for endogeneity and gather consistent estimation, the panel data analysis is applied, together with 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Therefore, this study apply two-step system estimator (SE) with 
adjusted standard errors as proposed by Arrelano and Bond (1998) to overcome heteroskedasticity.  
Finding and Discussion 
Descriptive statistic 
 In terms of board size, on average 15 directors sat on the board of banks in China and the smallest is only 
6 members in Indonesia’s banks. Further, banks in Malaysia and Indonesia have more than 50% of 
independent directors who have minimal or no business dealings with the banks compared to only 11.78% 
in banks located in Japan. For board average age, the members of the banks in these six countries are in 
the range of 55 to 65 years old. Banks in Thailand record the uppermost number of female director with 
17.60% while the lowermost is banks in Japan with only 1.78%. Whereby the rest of the banks in China, 
Philippines and Malaysia is on average of 12%. Moreover, 3.38% of total outstanding loans is a non-
performing loan in Thailand’s banks, while only 1.01% recorded as a non-performing loan for the banks in 
China. The share price of the banks located at Indonesia, Philippines, Japan and China has a volatility more 
than 30% over a period of time, whereas banks in Malaysia have a lower volatility at 15.44% which means 
that a security's value changes at a steady pace. Additionally, banks in Indonesia have set aside 1.06% as 
an allowance for uncollected loans compared to banks in Japan with only 0.05%. At last, Indonesian banks 
have the highest ROA during the period of study with 2.09%, followed by banks in Philippines (1.56%), banks 
in Malaysia (1.20%), banks in Thailand (1.19%) and banks in China (1.17%). Yet, banks in Japan proven to 
report the lowest ROA (ROE) of 0.25% (5.35%).  
Table 2:  Descriptive statistic based on country used in this study. 
Country     China Philippines  Indonesia Japan Malaysia Thailand 
Obs. 85/17 45/9 30/6 370/74 30/6 35/7 
B_Size 15.36 12.76 6.67 10.47 10.00 12.66 
B_Ind 36.32 30 53.2 11.78 53.08 42.54 
BA_Age 55.54 65.42 60.01 59.78 61.24 62.58 
B_Female 12.73 13.11 7.67 1.78 11.26 17.6 
NPL 1.01 1.99 2.1 1.33 2.12 3.38 
Vol. 30.01 32.64 35.53 31.3 15.44 28.04 
L_loss 0.4 0.29 1.06 0.05 0.15 0.67 
ROA 1.17 1.56 2.09 0.25 1.2 1.19 
ROE 19.01 12.94 17.04 5.35 14.88 13.54 
Notes: log (B_Size) = logarithm board size; B_Indepen = Board Independence and BA_Age = Board average age; B_Female = 
Board Female director; C_Duality = CEO duality; NPL = Non-performing loan; L_loss = Loss loan provision; Vol = share price 
volatility; ROA = Return on Assets; ROE = Return on Equity. 
itεeffectcountry *7βeffectyear *7β                         
Vol*7βL_loss*6βNPL*5βC_Duality*5β                         
B_Female*4βBA_Age*3βB_Indepen*2β)Log(B_Size*1βα
++
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Regression result  
The study presents exhaustive empirical findings from the application of Pooled OLS, FEM and system GMM. 
This is to validate the robustness of the GMM model as opposed to the other two aforementioned models. In 
a usual methodological approach, the study simultaneously deals with the possible endogeneity problem of 
governance variables and unobserved heterogeneity of individual banks in the sample countries. The Hansen 
statistics indicate the validity of the selected instruments. The AR (1) and AR (2) statistics do not reject the 
null hypothesis of no first and second degree of autocorrelation. Table 3 demonstrates the results of the 
POLS, FEM and System GMM employed with the ROA as the dependent variable which entailed for year 
effect and country effect in Model 2 and without as Model 1. Likewise Table 4 does with ROE and the results 
are almost identical. 
The result reported that with a greater board independence the banks in all countries performed increasingly 
better. Both proxies (ROA and ROE) supported do not reject H1 there is positive relationship between board 
independent and bank performance. Consistent with the previous finding of Garcia-Meca et al., (2015) on 
nine western countries namely Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK, 
and US. Robust result under system GMM also prove the similar result. This shows that the independent 
board directors efficiently utilizes their expertise and role in monitoring manager behavior to help bank 
increase performance (Al-Najjar, 2014; Pathan & Skully, 2010). 
Pooled OLS and GMM models show that banks attain increasingly higher performance if board size grows 
in number. Therefore, H2 is not rejected there is positive relationship between board size and bank 
performance. After controlling the year and countries effect (Model 2), under system-GMM, bank 
performance as measured by ROA and ROE does show that different year and country significantly influence 
the result. In theory, increasingly bigger board size promotes higher bank performance. It shows that the free 
rider problem as suggested by Jensen (1993) may not exist in this bank. All the directors on board may 
effectively functioning to help in problem solving (Hableblian & Finkelstein, 1993) and act as advisory to 
manager on companies’ strategies (Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Dallas, 2001). However, in practical sense the 
positive correlation between board size and bank performance will not be true. Common sense dictates that 
there must be a limit to the size and beyond which the marginal benefit from increasing board size will decline. 
The relationship between the size and performance should be U-shaped as suggested by Andres and 
Vallelado (2008). 
The average age of board members shows an inverse relationship with bank performance (ROA and ROE). 
Thus, H3 is rejected there is a positive relationship between board average age and bank performance. A 
younger set of board members promotes bank performance. From a human capital perspective, those at 
their prime age in productive employment will contribute effectively. However the pooled OLS models fail to 
reject the null hypothesis when the country differences taken into account. The results from FEM and GMM 
models provide the robust outputs. Bank would face high agency problem with young directors on board 
(Nguyen, 2015). Ararat et al., (2010) suggest bank should have diverse generation in board to make bank 
better perform. Pooled OLS indicates a positive finding between board gender and bank performance (ROA 
and ROE) at 10% significance level. Gender is an influencing deterministic factor in some countries. 
However, a reverse result, reported in all models across FEM and system GMM, provides a negative 
parameter sign and fails to reject the null hypothesis in the case of board gender. The board gender is not a 
significant influence on bank performance. Hence, H4 there is positive relationship between board gender 
and bank performance is rejected. This contradicts with findings of Mateos de Cabo et al., (2012), Pathan 
and Faff (2013) and García-Meca et al., (2015) where women director is value added that can help bank to 
performance better. 
For the variable CEO duality, almost all models across the three methods fail to reject the null hypothesis 
and show a negative parameter sign. Only, the results of pooled OLS in Table 3 (ROA) and system GMM in 
Table 4 (ROE) under Model 1 without country and year effect are negatively significant at 1% level. Therefore, 
H5 there is negative relationship between CEO duality and bank performance is not rejected as measured by 
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ROE. Duality position makes CEO tend to be risk adverse in thinking about their non-diversified wealth 
(Pathan, 2010; Wang et al., 2012). 
The bank credit risk factor as portrayed by NPL show insignificant influence on bank performance. For taking 
a higher risk banks will expect a higher return. Loans that are not performing as expected are covered by a 
provision for loan losses. Since NPL is only a footnoted item in the balance sheet, thus it does not impact 
bank profitability directly. The result is contradicting to Mausya, (2009), Qin & Pastory (2012), Li & Zou (2014), 
Lata (2014), Roy (2015) and Chimkono, et al., (2016) bank would face financial crisis due to increase in 
NPLs. The loan loss provision shows negative impact on the bank performance as the shown in Table 3 and 
Table 4. Banks charged their expected loan loss against reported profit and loss. It is obvious that the banks’ 
profitability measure indicates an inverse correlation with the variable loan loss. Bank create a loan loss 
provisions to lessen the risk that can impact their performance (Miller & Noulas, 1997; Vong, 2005; Ramlall, 
2009; Sufian & Habibullah, 2009). Investors digest the news of poor bank performance and then value the 
firm accordingly. The results of the models indicate so in which higher volatility of stock price has a negative 
correlation with the bank profitability measures. 
Table 3: Regression result board governance and bank performance based on ROA. 
  POLS  FEM  System GMM  
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
       
B_Ind 0.0164*** 0.0074*** 0.0046*** 0.0061*** 0.0042*** 0.0047*** 
 (-0.0014) (-0.0013) (-0.0015) (-0.0016) (-0.0010) (-0.0016) 
B_Size 0.0235*** 0.0179*** -0.0050 -0.0033 0.0091 0.0210** 
 (-0.0059) (-0.0049) (-0.0083) (-0.0083) (-0.0060) (-0.0088) 
BA_Age 0.0113** -0.0066 -0.0150** -0.0142** -0.0081** -0.0144* 
 (-0.0053) (-0.0049) (-0.0062) (-0.0063) (-0.0040) (-0.0083) 
B_Female 0.0052* -0.0035* -0.0021 -0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0010 
 (-0.0027) (-0.0021) (-0.0021) (-0.0021) (-0.0025) (-0.0027) 
C_Duality -0.1224*** 0.0332 -0.0112 -0.0158 -0.0521 -0.0026 
 (-0.0460) (-0.0336) (-0.0386) (-0.0385) (-0.0332) (-0.0476) 
NPL -0.0106 -0.0066 0.0016 0.0002 0.0222* 0.0107 
 (-0.0129) (-0.0097) (-0.0148) (-0.0150) (-0.0126) (-0.0152) 
L_loss 0.5360*** -0.3313*** -0.4084*** -0.3743*** -0.0382 -0.3115*** 
 (-0.0669) (-0.0674) (-0.0573) (-0.0596) (-0.0568) (-0.1078) 
Vol. -0.0010 -0.0038*** -0.0020* -0.0021* -0.0012 -0.0033** 
 (-0.0017) (-0.0013) (-0.0010) (-0.0011) (-0.0008) (-0.0013) 
ROA t-1     0.7342*** 0.5042*** 
     (-0.0586) (-0.0823) 
Constant -0.6835** 2.4896*** 1.6873*** 1.5619*** 0.5023* 1.7476*** 
 -0.3391 -0.3200 -0.3874 -0.3965 -0.2607 -0.5500 
Year Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.5601 0.7886 0.1292 0.1489     
AR(1)      -2.56***  -2.55*** 
AR(2)     0.41 0.68 
Hansen J-Stat     114.75 107.66 
No. of instruments 119 119 119 119 119 119 
No. of 
observations 595 595 595 595 476 476 
Notes: log (B_Size) = logarithm board size; B_Indepen = Board Independence and BA_Age = Board average age; 
B_Female = Board Female director; C_Duality = CEO duality; NPL = Non-performing loan; L_loss = Loss loan provision; 
Vol = share price volatility; ROA = Return on Assets. ***, ***, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 4: Regression result board governance and bank performance based on ROE.  
  POLS  FEM System GMM  
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
B_Ind 0.2190*** 0.1575*** 0.0800*** 0.1044*** 0.1287*** 0.1045*** 
 (-0.0139) (-0.0155) (-0.0226) (-0.0249) (-0.0465) (-0.0344) 
B_Size 0.3198*** 0.0884 -0.1142 -0.0825 0.4302** 0.3347* 
 (-0.0593) (-0.0604) (-0.1284) (-0.1279) (-0.1940) (-0.2020) 
BA_Age -0.2664*** -0.0694 -0.1722* -0.1610* -0.4541*** -0.1853 
 (-0.0527) (-0.0598) (-0.0962) (-0.0977) (-0.1659) (-0.2292) 
B_Female 0.1104*** 0.0491* -0.0479 -0.0416 0.0510 0.0403 
 (-0.0272) (-0.0259) (-0.0326) (-0.0327) (-0.0673) (-0.0667) 
C_Duality -1.5189*** 0.0219 -0.8062 -0.8614 -3.3514*** -1.1363 
 (-0.4599) (-0.4102) (-0.5952) (-0.5925) (-1.1359) (-0.9701) 
NPL -0.4270*** -0.1628 0.1127 0.0997 -0.1020 -0.1546 
 (-0.1286) (-0.1180) (-0.2274) (-0.2308) (-0.3333) (-0.4386) 
L_loss 0.1842 -5.0993*** -6.9161*** -6.3871*** -0.4085 -5.9451** 
 (-0.6691) (-0.8235) (-0.8834) (-0.9168) (-1.4252) (-2.3108) 
Vol. -0.0359** -0.0643*** -0.0497*** -0.0570*** -0.0435 -0.0484 
 (-0.0169) (-0.0164) (-0.0156) (-0.0174) (-0.0296) (-0.0305) 
ROE t-1     0.1719 -0.0222 
     (-0.1505) (-0.1144) 
Constant 18.5345*** 20.0210*** 22.6210*** 20.8938*** 29.8808*** 25.8692* 
 -3.3938 -3.9115 -5.9721 -6.1037 -11.0348 -15.3830 
Year Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.5969 0.7110 0.1558 0.1772     
AR(1)      -1.66*  -1.65* 
AR(2)     1.60 1.20 
Hansen J-Stat     92.12 85.03 
No. of 
instruments 119 119 119 119 119 119 
No. of 
observations 595 595 595 595 476 476 
Notes: log (B_Size) = logarithm board size; B_Indepen = Board Independence and BA_Age = Board average age; 
B_Female = Board Female director; C_Duality = CEO duality; NPL = Non-performing loan; L_loss = Loss loan provision; 
Vol = share price volatility; ROE = Return on Equity. ***, ***, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Conclusions 
This study empirically examine the impact of board governance on bank performance with a sample of 119 
commercial bank in Asia (namely China, Philippine, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia and Thailand) over the 
period 2011-2016.  Board governance proxies used in this study are size of board, board independence, 
board average age, female director on board and CEO duality while the bank performance is measured 
based on ROA and ROE. Based on panel data analysis, the result of this study presented based on POLS, 
FEM and System GMM.  
There is strong evidence that the more independent directors serve on board, the more the board is able to 
help banks to enhance their performance. The result suggests that bank with large board size can achieve 
better performance since it can effectively monitor manager decision. Other than that, this study reveal that 
young people serve on board would contribute more to the bank performance since they could bring more 
creative idea and high productivity. However, the result also shows that female director on board and CEO 
duality are insignificant to influence the bank performance.  
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